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THE TERCENTENARY OF A GREAT FAILURE
At the very hour of writing, three hundred years ago, namely,
at noon on Dec. 24, 1623, a very melancholy little company of
men, representing the dissolved English factory of Hirado, wended
its way towards the East India Company ship Bull and uttered its
farewell not merely to the coast of Japan but to all the high hopes
which those shores had inspired a brief decade earlier. The ac-
quaintances of these men, Dutch and Japanese-no doubt wi~h
varying degrees of sincerity-had endeavored to give the leave-
taking some semblance of jollity, in consonance with the season.
by presents; of many things edible and ddnkable. But the hearts
of the prospective voyagers could not but be sad, although in
ignorance of the full extent of their failure as pioneers in a great
and promising venture.
* * * *
'rhe tercentenary of the closing of Hirado to the East India
Company will, in all probability, have few. to call this failure to
the minds of men, yet it seems fitting to draw some charitable
attention to the event, if only to suggest the degree to which
thereby the fortunes of Pacific history have been deflected and to
point a moral as to the momentous consequences which may fol-
low upon one man's mistaken decision.
It is not at present popular to say much of the personal fac-
tors which shape the course of human history, but it is surel"
quite impossible to call attention to this particular incident without
also suggesting that the action of Sir John Saris in 1613, for
which nothing but his own personal obstinacy may be held respon-
sible, not only decided the events of Dec. 24, 1623, but also the
tum which the history of the Pacific was to take for the quarter
of a millenium.
(3)
To tell our story properly it is necessary to go a little further
back than the 17th. Century. The early success of the Portuguese
navigators and the subsequent Bull of Pope Alexander VI had
given the little Peninsula kingdom a practical monopoly in the
trade of the Orient. Then the usual Nemesis of monopoly ap-
peared in greediness and pride. Portugal was receiving sufficient
revenue from her Oriental business to provide for the administra-
tion of the entire kingdom and at Lisbon, as in the days of Solo-
mon, "gold was nothing accounted of," when in 1580 the union of
the crowns of Spain and Portugal and the war with the Nether-
lands led to the closing of the port of Lisbon against the Dutch.
This was not only a mistake; it was a very short-sighted one; for
the Dutch pilots who had accompanied the fleets of Portugal to
the Orient were well acquainted with the opportunities in that di-
rection and, moreover, quite equal to the task of managing vessels
of. their own in pursuit of the lure. Pilots of other nationality
were also ready to throw in their lot with the sturdy Protestants
from the Low Countries who, at the risk of being regarded and
treated as pirates, were contesting the claims of the Peninsula to
the rulership of the waves.
So it happened that with the first "fleete of sayle" which
left Holland in lS9~ for the Far East by way of the Americas
there sailed as pilot that remarkable Englishman, Will Adams.
From the fate which overtook and swallowed up the rest of the
fleet one ship, the Liefde, with but a scant handful of men, in-
cluding Adams, was cast up on the shores of Japan just at the
time the first Tokugawa Shogun, Iyeyasu, was commencing his
career as the dictator of the Empire. It was only natural that
the Portuguese friars should accuse Adams and his fellows to the
Shogun as pirates, but it was just as natural that that shrewd
judge of men should at once size up the British pilot as a man to
be saved and employed. One likes to think of these h;vo men
meeting face to face. On the one hand, the most far-seeing and
politic of Japanese statesmen, who had learned the wisdom of
tightening the strings of his helmet after the battle and was already
conscious of the insecurity which lurked in the relations between
the Portuguese and the daim:yos of the south. In the person of
Adams Iyeyasu looked upon a new type of human instrument.
On the other hand, there was the bluff Elizabethan sailor, a man
who so easily may have seen· the Shakespere who shared with
Iyeyasu the year 1616 for his departure hence, a man ready to
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use his unusual powers in the service of a leader whom he al
once recognized as a master of men. The two of them might have
gone far in company had other things been propitious. On my
recent visit to Japan I could not help linking together in thought
the splendid mausoleum at Nikko sacred to the memory of the
great Shogun and the Anjin-zulw, or Pilot's Grave, near Yoku-
suka, where sleeps the dust of that valiant sailor from the "spa-
cious days" of Queen Elizabeth.
It is not to be forgotten-what is indeed essential to the under-
standing of our story-that at the opening of the 17th. Century,
when the issue of the great battle of Sekigahara had placed all
Japan in the hands of the Tokugawa, there was no thought on the
part of Iyeyasu of putting a ban upon the foreigner's desire to
trade. On the contrary, \Vill Adams was accepted not so much to
be adviser as to be master-ship-builder to the Yedo government.
He was rewarded with the rank of hatamoto and with the gift of
a substantial estate precisely in view of the Shogun's intention
that thereby might be furthered the grandiose designs of trade
with China and Manila, and even with Mexico and California.
There was certainly no disposition at this time on the part of the
Oriental shell-fish to seek security from enemies actual or possible
by withdrawal into the fastness of its shell.
The responsibility for the change of policy must be shared
by a number-Portuguese, Dutch, and the daimyos of the south-
ern island included-but the actual incident which brought about
the fateful decision (whether for good or ill we will not surmise)
is something for which one man, the Englishman John Saris, must
accept the blame.
Many great English captains had set the Papal Interdict at
defiance before the end of the 16th Century, but the founding of
the London East India Company in the last days of the year 1600,
for "the discovery of Cathay and divers other regions, dominions,
islands and places unknown" was provoked by nothing more ideal
than a rise in the price of pepper, a mistake on the part of the
Dutch due to overconfidence in the permanence of their monopoly.
Yet, strange to say, it was some time before the London merchants
really awoke sufficiently to their opportunity to get busy. One of
the first ventures was that under Capt. vVaymouth which left in
1602 to go to "the kingdom of Cataya or China" by the North-
west Passage. John Cartwright, a preacher of London, was en-
gaged as chaplain at the extravagant salary of three pounds a
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year, of which sum, however, he was to get but half if the expedi-
tion did not return by way of China. Even of this magnificent
moiety the unfortunate cleric was balked, since the voyage failed,
and the failure was attributed to the half-hearted exhortations of
the ill-used chaplain. His patror.s were even unkind enough to
demand back the gown and other apparel in the splendor of which
he was to have appeared at the Chinese Court.
Thus it was not till the 11th of June, 1613, that the first Eng-
lish ship appeared in Japanese waters. This pioneer vessel was
the Clove, under the command of Sir John Saris.
Often in history has English obstinacy proved valuable to the
plans and purposes of the race, but on this occasion an English-
man's obstinacy turned out to be the undoing of something more
than personal .fortune. Saris was, as Brinkley describes him,
"self-opinionated, suspicious, and of shallow judgement," and he
seems from the first to have underestimated the capacity of Will
Adams. He had already received advices as to the Pilot's influ-
ence in the Empire, but he wrote of him "he is only fit to be
master of a junk;" In all this he was, as his contemporarie;i
acknowledged, "quite wrong and unjust." Perhaps we may qualify
what was said above to the extent of confessing that circum-
stances are to some slight extent responsible for Sir John's ill-
temper. Adams had written to the captain of the Clove to Ban-
tam some months previously, but the letter had miscarried, so that
when the ship arrived at Hirado some tedious weeks had to elapse
before Adams could be found and brought from Yedo. Once
arrived, the English pilot was not slow to impress on Saris the
necessity of setting forth as speedily as possible for the capital,
especially as he was the bearer of a Royal Letter from King
James I to the ruler of Japan. The start was made on August 6,
1613, and on the 8th of September the captain of the Clove was
admitted to Iyeyasu's presence. The letter was first transliterated
into kana by Adams, then into the ideographic style by the J apan-
ese scholars, and so passed into the Shogun's hands.
The point to which our attention should a~ this juncture be
especially directed is the large knowledge the Tokugawa showed
of geography and of world affairs, and the intelligence with which
he appreciated the opportunity which fortune and the experience
of Adams had placed within his grasp. He asked about the Eng-
lishman's knowledge (little enough in truth) of Yezo, Saghalien,
Kamchatka, and so on, and spoke sympathetically of the difficulties
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incident to making the North-west Passage. He then proceeded
to draw up a Charter and Agreement which consitute one of the
most liberal and remarkable trade documents ever proposed be-
tween East and West. Had it been accepted and acted upon by
Saris and the Company, much subsequent trouble and display
of Occidental belligerency would have been saved. The main pro-
visions of the Agreement, which was signed on Oct. 1, 1613, are
as follows:
1. The Clove might carryon trade of all kinds without hin-
drance, while subsequent visits of English ships would be similarlY
welcomed.
2. Ships might visit any ports in Japan they chose and, in
case of storms, put into any harbor.
3. Ground would be given in Yedo for the erection of fac-
tories and houses, and, in event of the return of the factors to
England, they were permitted to dispose of the buildings in any
way they w~shed.
4. If any Englishman committeed on offence on Japanese
soil, he should be punished by the English general "according to
the gravity of his offence." (Note here the first recognition of the
rights of extra-territoriality in the Far East).
Now Saris has no excuse whatsoever for not understanding
the liberality of the concessions thus offered. For four days he
stayed with Adams at the latter's house at Uraga, surveyed the
harbor, which h~ found to be excellent, and otherwise looked the
gift-horse in the mouth.
But, alas for the future of the Company in Japan, he obstin-
ately clung to his earlier commitments with the Dutch and with
the Hirado daimyo. The Hirado factors, too, were becoming im-
patient and incensed with Adams, the sincerity of whose recom-
mendations they doubted since to them he was but "a naturalized
Japanner." So relations between the two Englishmen grew more
and more strained and unpleasant. The Clove eventually sailed
from Hirado on her homeward voyage, Dec. 5, 1613, after having
started the factory at that place with a capital of some seven
thousand pounds. The departure left also in the breast of \Vill
Adams a certain sense of disapointment, not unmingled with a
little homesickness.
But of far more fatal moment was the impression left upon
the mind of Tokugawa Iyeyasu. It must be remembered that this
great statesman was still engaged in consolidating the position of
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his clan in regard to the Shogunate. Determined not to invite
the fate which had befallen the family of Yoritoino, he resolved
that no weak links in the line of his descendants should break the
chain of power he had forged for controlling the destinies of Ja-
pan. Partly to ensure this he placed the supreme authority in the
hands of his son years before his own death. For the same reason
he is believed to have fonnulated the famous policy embodied in
the so-called "Legacy of Iyeyasu." In his path were many for-
midable obstacles, among which the loyalty of most of the south-
ern daimyos to the house of Toyotomi, whose power the Toku-
gawa had temporarily crushed, was the most considerable. There
was beside the difficult situation brought about by the presence of
the Portuguese friars and by their quarrels with competitive pro-
pagandists from Spain. Undoubtedly, however, the most menac-
ing danger lurked in the independent spirit of the clans who were
destined nearly two and a half centuries later to play so large a
part in the dissolution of the Tokugawa dominance. These great
and warlike families resented the centralization of authority at
Yedo and were ready to use any methods by which its permanence
might be destroyed. Moreover, the great strength of these clans
lay in the possession of a practical monopoly of trade with the
foreigners, as this trade had hitherto been conducted at such
places as Nagasaki and Hirado. Foreign trade had brought them
wealth, military equipment, and the spirit of independence which
the possession of these things engendered.
Therefore, the question which burned like fire in the heart of
Iyeyasu during these last years of his life was this. Failing to
secure a share of foreign commerce through the presence of Eng-
lish ships in Uraga Bay and their association with his own de-
signs, would it not be the part of wisdom to close the portals of
the Empire against the foreigners altogether and so counter-act
by one stroke of policy alike the ambitions of the rebel daimyos,
the designs of the missionaries and all the intrigue, actual or po-
tential, of Portuguese, Spanish, and all the rest?
That Iyeyasu answered this question in the affirmative and
that his successors in the Shogunate carried his answer into effect
is one of the important facts of Oriental history. The decision
was a momentous one. Some have regarded it as a wise and
statesmanlike policy which saved Japan from the absorption which
became the fate of some other lands. Others have esteemed it
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foolish and short-sighted. In any event, it determined largely the
course history was to take in the Pacific in the centuries to fol-
low. And the ultimate responsibility, as we have seen, rests not
after all with Iyeyasu or with his descendants, but with one ob-
stinate English captain who failed to discern, what is so obvious
to us all today, that the acceptance of the invitation to establish
trade at Yedo was an opportunity at which foresight should have
leaped without a second thought. That acceptance would have
spelled a long career of English supremacy in the commerce of
the Pacific and the avoidance, on the part of Japan, of the policy
of segregation which has only in recent times been discontinued.
It remains to be said that the factory of Hirado turned out
to be a moribund concern almost from the start. The good words
of the Dutch proved to have little sincerity behind them, s,ince the
Holland merchants at once lowered their prices to offset the new
competition. The goods brought by the English ships proved for
the most part unsaleable in Japan; Richard Cocks, the English
agent, made about as many mistakes as were possible in the time;
and ere long one Wickham wrote that unless the merchants
opened up trade with the Moluccas and with China, or engaged in
plundering expeditions like the Dutch, "the Japan trade was not
worth continuing."
The last suggestion, namely, that a policy of plundering mighr
recoup some of their commercial losses, was even adopted in
company with the Dutch at Manila and elsewhere, but the end
was now not far off. In 1619 the English factors had gone so far
in their facilis decensus that they were mobbed in the streets of
Hirado by Dutch and Japanese alike, and the sight of English
prizes brought by the Dutch into the harbor must have caused
the iron to enter deeply into .their souls.
At last came, from the Oriental headquarters of the Company
in Batavia, the letter to "Mr. Cox and the rest" ordering the dis-
solution of the factory. That the letter was signed by "Your lov-
ing Friends, Richard Fursland, Thos. Brockenden, Aug. Spalding"
did not diminish the humiliation of the moment.
So let me conclude as I commenced: At noon on Dec. 24,
1623, just three hundred years ago, the English factors of Hirado
sailed away in the Bull, and the curtain was rung down upon the
story of a great opportunity rendered "frustrate and vagabond"
by one man's wilfulness.
The Portuguese hung on in Japan precariously a while longer
and were then turned out bag and baggage. The Dutch resigned
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themselves to an ignOlmmous accommodation with fortune and
clung to their little foothold of a prison at Deshima till the re-
opening of the Empire. But, from Dec. 24, 1623, Japan was, with
these exceptions, straitly shut up against the commerce of the
outside world.
I have wondered whether, from some purgatorial or celestial
residence, the two English seamen I have mentioned, Will Adams
and John Saris, may not have sometimes looked down upon the
scene of their former adventure. If so, I wonder again whether
the Pilot could have refrained muttering to the Captain: "I told
you so!"
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